Jlots Doctrine
2021年7月6日Register here: http://gg.gg/va9vc
Tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) operations by the US Military Services during the conduct of joint operations. It provides basic doctrine concerning command relationships, responsibilities, and procedures for JLOTS operations. Doctrine, principles, and guidance established. Common doctrine and procedures, each others’ infrastructure and bases, and to be able to communicate with each other. It reduces duplication in an Alliance of 26 members, allow pooling of resources, and even produces synergies among members. Interoperability does not necessarily require common military equipment. What is important.Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore [JLOTS]
Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore [JLOTS] consists of loading / unloading of ships without fixed port facilities, in friendly or nondefended territory, and, in time of war, during phases of theater development in which there is no opposition by the enemy.
SECDEF included JLOTS program oversight responsibility in the USTRANSCOM Implementation Plan, and JCS further defined the JLOTS role in Joint Pub 4-01.2, (Sealift of Joint Forces) and Joint Pub 4-01.6, (JLOTS Operations).
Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS) provides required operational maneuver capabilities in areas of anti-access or area-denial and/or underdeveloped ports. Components provide equipment and train and exercise this capability to include at least one liquid-cargo and dry-cargo joint exercise per year. The Military Departments continue to evaluate interoperable technologies to provide this capability in environments greater than Sea State 2.
Although JLOTS will probably continue to play a large role in intra-theater movements and in supplementing other transportation systems, it does not appear that JLOTS can provide sufficient throughput quantities to meet the Objective Force guidance provided in the Future Combat System’s (FCS) Statement of Required Capabilities.
The DPG calls for one liquid and one dry cargo JLOTS annually in conjunction with a JCS exercise. In FY95-99 USTRANSCOM worked with the geographical CINCS to schedule 2 separate JLOTS exercises - 1 liquid and 1 dry JLOTS annually. During FY00-05 USTRANSCOM worked to schedule one combined liquid & dry exercise annually to more closely simulate a contingency operation. TRANSCOM programs for JCS funding. The funding is to be used for strategic lift, port handling and inland transportation. The Services program for costs associated with unit participation.
By 1999 three out of the last four exercises were cancelled.
The first of these exercises was SOUTHCOM’s FUERTES DEFENSAS in 1995. TRANSCOM rated it yellow based on a last minute recommendation from SOUTHCOM to shift the exercise location from Puerto Rico to Ft. Story, due to concerns over increased hurricane activity in the Caribbean. This change, occurring only one month before planned execution, required significant crisis action planning from USTRANSCOM, USACOM, and USSOUTHCOM. Additionally, high currents off Ft. Story significantly hampered discharge operations, resulting in only limited operational success.
In FY96, CENTCOM successfully executed a dry JLOTS integrated with BRIGHT STAR and ACOM successfully completed a liquid JLOTS in MARKET SQUARE.
In FY97, ACOM initially stated they would not conduct a JLOTS during that FY. After much negotiation at the G.O. level, they later reversed their decision and successfully planned and executed a dry JLOTS in support of JTFEX 97-2 off Ft. Story, Virginia. Also in FY97, PACOM completed their liquid JLOTS in support of FREEDOM BANNER in Australia. TRANSCOM rated this exercise as yellow based on the significant difficulty encountered transferring product from the Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS) to the Inland Petroleum Distribution System (IPDS). Inadequate interface between these two systems prevented successful pumping to the final destination.
Both of TRANSCOM’s FY98 JLOTS exercises were cancelled. EUCOM’s DYNAMIC MIX JLOTS was cancelled based on USAREUR’s inability to support due to funding shortfalls. CENTCOM cancelled its liquid JLOTS associated with NATIVE FURY when it became heavily involved with a real world contingency in the Persian Gulf (DESERT THUNDER).
TRANSCOM’s scheduled FY99 JLOTS exercises were PACOM’s FOAL EAGLE and SOUTHCOM’s BLUE ADVANCE. In an attempt to make up for lost training resulting from the NATIVE FURY Liquid JLOTS cancellation, TRANSCOM worked closely with PACOM and CFC to include liquid JLOTS operations in addition to the already planned dry JLOTS The dry JLOTS was conducted in Pusan to discharge elements of the 3rd Bde, 2ID. This was also a Combined JLOTS, with elements of the ROK Army’s Port Operations Group working side by side with U.S. Army and Navy JLOTS forces. Liquid JLOTS was conducted in Pohang in conjunction with MPF discharge operations supporting related FREEDOM BANNER. Although somewhat limited in scope, this combined JLOTS was very successful.
Planning for a liquid JLOTS integrated with SOUTHCOM’s BLUE ADVANCE proceeded relatively well. Unfortunately, increased political opposition after the Naval exercise held on the Island of Vieques, lead CINCLANTFLT to recommend and CINCSOUTH to approve, cancellation of this exercise. SOUTHCOM also declined to plan and execute an alternative exercise during the FY.
Exercise planners are not accomplishing long-term planning of the JLOTS portion of exercises. Typically, planning does not begin more than 12-18 months out from execution. This does not allow adequate definition of Service requirements far enough in advance for Services to program and fund resources. Additionally, major execution obstacles are often not discovered until late in the planning cycle, leaving inadequate time to resolve the issues or plan alternatives.
Chapter 12 Isaiah sits in the church garden planting flowers where Tsotsi, who was on his way to seek redemption from God, finds him he explains how he works for God and that when he rings the church bell it calls to all the other people who believe in god and invites him back next time the bells ring to find God. Chapter 12: Tsotsi goes to the church to seek redemption and forgiveness from God for all the sins he has committed. After, Tsotsi returns to the ruins where Miriam is feeding the baby. When Miriam tells Tsotsi that her milk is sour, she means that her life, heart and life is sour without her husband. Tsotsi chapter 12 book summary.Lots Doctrine Jobs
The size and scope of JLOTS exercises continue to be limited. This can be attributed to numerous factors, some of which include: budget reductions, OPTEMPO concerns, and decreased availability of exercise cargo. Slots berlin casino.
The important challenge reflects the extent to which, no matter what initiatives are taken to improve the program, it cannot be successful without the full support of the warfighting CINCs. In times of tight budgets and OPTEMPO concerns, typically not all initial exercise objectives can be achieved with the limited forces and funds available. Inevitably, a cut line is established and lower priority objectives fall out. Funding for JLOTS continues to decline for both joint & service funds.
Turbo Patriot 2000 was the first U.S. Transportation Command-sponsored exercise specifically designed to test and evaluate the actual movement of forces and cargo in a joint-logistics- over-the-shore environment. The exercise entailed the real world movement of the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii to the U.S. Marine Corps base at Camp Pendleton on the Southern California coast. MSC assets involved in this operation included USNS Seay and the Ready Reserve Force ships SS Cape Mohican, SS Chesapeake, and MV Grand Canyon State.
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
Accession Number : ADA581316
Title : The Relevance and Future of Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) OperationsLots Doctrine Vs
Descriptive Note : Master’s thesis
Corporate Author : NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV NORFOLK VA JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL
Personal Author(s) : Fisher, Rhonda L
Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a581316.pdf
Jlots DoctrineReport Date : Apr 2013Lots Doctrine Definition
Pagination or Media Count : 82
Abstract : While the United States military is unmatched in its ability to project forces anywhere in the world, this advantage is only enjoyed because of reliance on strategic airlift and sealift combined with world-class port and airfield infrastructure. As an option, Joint Logistics over the Shore (JLOTS) operations enable strategic ship offload through inadequate or damaged ports, or over a bare beach. The Department of Defense (DoD) must ensure that this capability is sufficient and integrated across the Joint Force. History has shown the advantage of projecting forces onto the shores of the enemy. However, periods between conflicts have often resulted in decreased budgets and less emphasis on capabilities such as amphibious operations and JLOTS. To continue to provide this flexible logistics option, the Services and the joint community must emphasize its importance through continued investment and increased joint collaboration. A comprehensive study to determine concepts, capabilities, and requirements for JLOTS to support future Joint force structures will ensure an accurate starting point for assessing JLOTS. Doctrine must reflect the importance of JLOTS to emerging concepts such as seabasing to ensure a seamless transition from one method of logistics delivery to another. Continued and expanded training opportunities will increase the breadth of JLOTS experience across all the Services. The platforms and capabilities existing today for JLOTS must continue to receive required funding to ensure availability when needed for the next contingency. Finally, the joint community must explore every opportunity to enhance its JLOTS capability to ensure that this capability is still viable as platforms and equipment reach the end of their serviceable life.
Lots Doctrine MeaningDescriptors : *AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS , *DELIVERY , *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES , *LOGISTICS SUPPORT , *MILITARY CAPABILITIES , *SHORES , AIRLIFT OPERATIONS , CASE STUDIES , FALKLAND ISLANDS , HAITI , KOREAN WAR , MILITARY HISTORY , PORTS(FACILITIES) , SEALIFT OPERATIONS , SECOND WORLD WAR , THESES , UNLOADING
Subject Categories : Humanities and History
Logistics, Military Facilities and Supplies
Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
Register here: http://gg.gg/va9vc
https://diarynote.indered.space
Tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) operations by the US Military Services during the conduct of joint operations. It provides basic doctrine concerning command relationships, responsibilities, and procedures for JLOTS operations. Doctrine, principles, and guidance established. Common doctrine and procedures, each others’ infrastructure and bases, and to be able to communicate with each other. It reduces duplication in an Alliance of 26 members, allow pooling of resources, and even produces synergies among members. Interoperability does not necessarily require common military equipment. What is important.Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore [JLOTS]
Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore [JLOTS] consists of loading / unloading of ships without fixed port facilities, in friendly or nondefended territory, and, in time of war, during phases of theater development in which there is no opposition by the enemy.
SECDEF included JLOTS program oversight responsibility in the USTRANSCOM Implementation Plan, and JCS further defined the JLOTS role in Joint Pub 4-01.2, (Sealift of Joint Forces) and Joint Pub 4-01.6, (JLOTS Operations).
Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore (JLOTS) provides required operational maneuver capabilities in areas of anti-access or area-denial and/or underdeveloped ports. Components provide equipment and train and exercise this capability to include at least one liquid-cargo and dry-cargo joint exercise per year. The Military Departments continue to evaluate interoperable technologies to provide this capability in environments greater than Sea State 2.
Although JLOTS will probably continue to play a large role in intra-theater movements and in supplementing other transportation systems, it does not appear that JLOTS can provide sufficient throughput quantities to meet the Objective Force guidance provided in the Future Combat System’s (FCS) Statement of Required Capabilities.
The DPG calls for one liquid and one dry cargo JLOTS annually in conjunction with a JCS exercise. In FY95-99 USTRANSCOM worked with the geographical CINCS to schedule 2 separate JLOTS exercises - 1 liquid and 1 dry JLOTS annually. During FY00-05 USTRANSCOM worked to schedule one combined liquid & dry exercise annually to more closely simulate a contingency operation. TRANSCOM programs for JCS funding. The funding is to be used for strategic lift, port handling and inland transportation. The Services program for costs associated with unit participation.
By 1999 three out of the last four exercises were cancelled.
The first of these exercises was SOUTHCOM’s FUERTES DEFENSAS in 1995. TRANSCOM rated it yellow based on a last minute recommendation from SOUTHCOM to shift the exercise location from Puerto Rico to Ft. Story, due to concerns over increased hurricane activity in the Caribbean. This change, occurring only one month before planned execution, required significant crisis action planning from USTRANSCOM, USACOM, and USSOUTHCOM. Additionally, high currents off Ft. Story significantly hampered discharge operations, resulting in only limited operational success.
In FY96, CENTCOM successfully executed a dry JLOTS integrated with BRIGHT STAR and ACOM successfully completed a liquid JLOTS in MARKET SQUARE.
In FY97, ACOM initially stated they would not conduct a JLOTS during that FY. After much negotiation at the G.O. level, they later reversed their decision and successfully planned and executed a dry JLOTS in support of JTFEX 97-2 off Ft. Story, Virginia. Also in FY97, PACOM completed their liquid JLOTS in support of FREEDOM BANNER in Australia. TRANSCOM rated this exercise as yellow based on the significant difficulty encountered transferring product from the Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS) to the Inland Petroleum Distribution System (IPDS). Inadequate interface between these two systems prevented successful pumping to the final destination.
Both of TRANSCOM’s FY98 JLOTS exercises were cancelled. EUCOM’s DYNAMIC MIX JLOTS was cancelled based on USAREUR’s inability to support due to funding shortfalls. CENTCOM cancelled its liquid JLOTS associated with NATIVE FURY when it became heavily involved with a real world contingency in the Persian Gulf (DESERT THUNDER).
TRANSCOM’s scheduled FY99 JLOTS exercises were PACOM’s FOAL EAGLE and SOUTHCOM’s BLUE ADVANCE. In an attempt to make up for lost training resulting from the NATIVE FURY Liquid JLOTS cancellation, TRANSCOM worked closely with PACOM and CFC to include liquid JLOTS operations in addition to the already planned dry JLOTS The dry JLOTS was conducted in Pusan to discharge elements of the 3rd Bde, 2ID. This was also a Combined JLOTS, with elements of the ROK Army’s Port Operations Group working side by side with U.S. Army and Navy JLOTS forces. Liquid JLOTS was conducted in Pohang in conjunction with MPF discharge operations supporting related FREEDOM BANNER. Although somewhat limited in scope, this combined JLOTS was very successful.
Planning for a liquid JLOTS integrated with SOUTHCOM’s BLUE ADVANCE proceeded relatively well. Unfortunately, increased political opposition after the Naval exercise held on the Island of Vieques, lead CINCLANTFLT to recommend and CINCSOUTH to approve, cancellation of this exercise. SOUTHCOM also declined to plan and execute an alternative exercise during the FY.
Exercise planners are not accomplishing long-term planning of the JLOTS portion of exercises. Typically, planning does not begin more than 12-18 months out from execution. This does not allow adequate definition of Service requirements far enough in advance for Services to program and fund resources. Additionally, major execution obstacles are often not discovered until late in the planning cycle, leaving inadequate time to resolve the issues or plan alternatives.
Chapter 12 Isaiah sits in the church garden planting flowers where Tsotsi, who was on his way to seek redemption from God, finds him he explains how he works for God and that when he rings the church bell it calls to all the other people who believe in god and invites him back next time the bells ring to find God. Chapter 12: Tsotsi goes to the church to seek redemption and forgiveness from God for all the sins he has committed. After, Tsotsi returns to the ruins where Miriam is feeding the baby. When Miriam tells Tsotsi that her milk is sour, she means that her life, heart and life is sour without her husband. Tsotsi chapter 12 book summary.Lots Doctrine Jobs
The size and scope of JLOTS exercises continue to be limited. This can be attributed to numerous factors, some of which include: budget reductions, OPTEMPO concerns, and decreased availability of exercise cargo. Slots berlin casino.
The important challenge reflects the extent to which, no matter what initiatives are taken to improve the program, it cannot be successful without the full support of the warfighting CINCs. In times of tight budgets and OPTEMPO concerns, typically not all initial exercise objectives can be achieved with the limited forces and funds available. Inevitably, a cut line is established and lower priority objectives fall out. Funding for JLOTS continues to decline for both joint & service funds.
Turbo Patriot 2000 was the first U.S. Transportation Command-sponsored exercise specifically designed to test and evaluate the actual movement of forces and cargo in a joint-logistics- over-the-shore environment. The exercise entailed the real world movement of the 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii to the U.S. Marine Corps base at Camp Pendleton on the Southern California coast. MSC assets involved in this operation included USNS Seay and the Ready Reserve Force ships SS Cape Mohican, SS Chesapeake, and MV Grand Canyon State.
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
Accession Number : ADA581316
Title : The Relevance and Future of Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) OperationsLots Doctrine Vs
Descriptive Note : Master’s thesis
Corporate Author : NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV NORFOLK VA JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL
Personal Author(s) : Fisher, Rhonda L
Full Text : https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a581316.pdf
Jlots DoctrineReport Date : Apr 2013Lots Doctrine Definition
Pagination or Media Count : 82
Abstract : While the United States military is unmatched in its ability to project forces anywhere in the world, this advantage is only enjoyed because of reliance on strategic airlift and sealift combined with world-class port and airfield infrastructure. As an option, Joint Logistics over the Shore (JLOTS) operations enable strategic ship offload through inadequate or damaged ports, or over a bare beach. The Department of Defense (DoD) must ensure that this capability is sufficient and integrated across the Joint Force. History has shown the advantage of projecting forces onto the shores of the enemy. However, periods between conflicts have often resulted in decreased budgets and less emphasis on capabilities such as amphibious operations and JLOTS. To continue to provide this flexible logistics option, the Services and the joint community must emphasize its importance through continued investment and increased joint collaboration. A comprehensive study to determine concepts, capabilities, and requirements for JLOTS to support future Joint force structures will ensure an accurate starting point for assessing JLOTS. Doctrine must reflect the importance of JLOTS to emerging concepts such as seabasing to ensure a seamless transition from one method of logistics delivery to another. Continued and expanded training opportunities will increase the breadth of JLOTS experience across all the Services. The platforms and capabilities existing today for JLOTS must continue to receive required funding to ensure availability when needed for the next contingency. Finally, the joint community must explore every opportunity to enhance its JLOTS capability to ensure that this capability is still viable as platforms and equipment reach the end of their serviceable life.
Lots Doctrine MeaningDescriptors : *AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS , *DELIVERY , *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES , *LOGISTICS SUPPORT , *MILITARY CAPABILITIES , *SHORES , AIRLIFT OPERATIONS , CASE STUDIES , FALKLAND ISLANDS , HAITI , KOREAN WAR , MILITARY HISTORY , PORTS(FACILITIES) , SEALIFT OPERATIONS , SECOND WORLD WAR , THESES , UNLOADING
Subject Categories : Humanities and History
Logistics, Military Facilities and Supplies
Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
Register here: http://gg.gg/va9vc
https://diarynote.indered.space
コメント